Tag: How we got here


How we got here: Redshirts



It’s an ugly word amongst Irish fans, as Notre Dame doesn’t officially redshirt anyone, but merely allows seniors to apply for a fifth year of eligibility and enroll in a graduate program.

But for the life blood of a competitive college football program, Notre Dame’s inability to utilize a fifth-year of eligibility among its offensive line and defensive front seven may be the number one reason why the Irish have struggled in recent history, and a major factor as to why the 2010 Irish football team has gone 4-5 in the first nine games of the Brian Kelly era.

If there’s one defining characteristic of the post-Lou Holtz era Notre Dame teams, it’s been a puzzling lack of physicality. While recruiting rankings always kept the Irish in the upper-echelon of college football (except for a few Davie and Willingham squads), Notre Dame never seems to develop the impact players on their roster that many Top 25 programs rode to major bowl games. Under Charlie Weis specifically, the Irish enjoyed some high-level recruits, but never produced top-flight offensive or defensive linemen.

To crystallize this point, let’s take a look at some of the best offensive line and front seven recruits that Notre Dame has brought to campus in the last seven years, who also turned into some of Notre Dame’s highest draft picks. Victor Abiamiri, Trevor Laws, and Ryan Harris were three of the most highly touted recruits in the celebrated 2003 class. Both Abiamiri and Harris played immediately for the Irish, with Laws only staying off the field because he missed the year with an injury. Harris became only the third true freshman in Notre Dame history to start along the offensive line, playing as an extremely undersized left tackle, getting by on his athleticism, quickness, and smarts. Abiamiri flashed talent, but played wasted much of his first year, contributing only 16 tackles and one sack during his freshman year. All three left Notre Dame after four seasons, with only Laws retaining the option of returning for a fifth year.

Under Charlie Weis, the trend was even worse. Starting with the heralded class of 2006, Weis played just about every freshman with a chance to get on the field. Offensive linemen like Sam Young saw the field immediately, potentially stunting his development by being thrown immediately into the fire. Guys like Eric Olsen and Matt Carufel saw the field in only mop-up time, wasting a season of eligibility for Olsen with just 20 minutes of playing time and more egregiously, Carufel spent a year of eligibility in just three minutes. Dan Wenger and Bartley Webb didn’t play, but mostly because they were hampered with injuries, while Chris Stewart was in the midst of a body transformation, having arrived on campus at nearly 400 pounds of poorly proportioned weight.

Weis’ disregard for redshirts was hardly lost on just offensive linemen. Undersized and overwhelmed defensive end John Ryan saw the field as a true freshman, as did highly touted pass-rushing prospect Morrice Richardson, logging only eleven minutes of playing time, mostly on special teams. Tight ends Will Yeatman and Konrad Reuland both played reserve roles, spending a year of eligibility while combining for zero catches as they backed up John Carlson and Marcus Freeman. In the secondary, Weis played cornerbacks Raeshon McNeil and Darrin Walls immediately, as well as safeties Sergio Brown and Jashaad Gaines, with Brown and Gaines logging solely special teams play. On a veteran 2006 team that had national title aspirations, Weis wasted the eligibility of nearly a dozen freshman that could be contributing on the roster in 2010.

How important are fourth and fifth year seniors to a team’s success? Let’s take a look at the BCS Top 25 and see how well they utilize veterans along the offensive line and in the front-seven of the defense.

Of the 12 “power positions,” look at how thin Notre Dame is compared to the rest of the top programs in college football. Only four players are fourth or fifth year players in the key positions along the line and in the front seven.

Digging even deeper, Notre Dame’s best seasons since 2002 have come when the Irish had age-appropriate depth in their power positions.

2002 (10-3): Nine of Twelve players in power positions were fourth of fifth year seniors.
2005 (9-3): Seven of Twelve players in power positions. Junior quarterback starting.
2006 (10-3): Ten of Twelve players in power positions. True senior quarterback.

While the easy answer to Notre Dame’s struggles is the early departure of Jimmy Clausen and Golden Tate, when you look deeper, the 2010 Irish are struggling not just because they lost two of their best offensive weapons, but because the Irish have failed systemically to build veteran depth over much of the last decade.

For the Irish to get back into the upper-echelon of college football, Brian Kelly will need to do something his predecessors showed no aptitude for: building a roster properly. The good news? Kelly already seems to understand that the best thing for young, talented players at non-skill positions — guys like Louis Nix, Christian Lombard, Kendall Moore and Justin Utupo — is the least logical thing for them to do.

Sit them on the bench and let them watch.

(Special thanks to the legendary FunkDoctorSpock and Brian Fremeau for their help in this column.)

How we got here: Turnovers


It was no secret that there were going to be some growing pains in the evolution of the Notre Dame offense. Brian Kelly was taking a drop-back quarterback with a total of 20 mop-up throws under his belt and putting him into an offensive system that relied on quick throws, quicker data processing, and presenting the threat of both running and passing. And oh, yeah… Crist would also be spending 95-percent of his time in the shotgun.

To call the union of junior quarterback Dayne Crist and Brian Kelly an arranged marriage wouldn’t be far from the truth. Both were stuck with each other, with Kelly having little to no depth behind the departing Jimmy Clausen thanks to the attrition of Weis recruits like Zack Frazer and Demetrius Jones and selective recruiting. There was plenty to like in Crist, a highly touted recruit that ran the football effectively during his prep days, but the Irish offense would hinge on how quickly Crist could learn the new offense, and how quickly his surgically repaired ACL would heal.

Crist took every snap in spring practice, absorbing as much of the offense as he could while the Irish also learned a vastly different way to practice. With a playbook in hand and a collection of skill players, Crist also worked diligently with his receiving corp, establishing a rapport in the offseason to help jump-start the season.

With a ruptured patellar tendon ending his first season as a starter, we can look at Crist’s numbers and compare them to the last few Notre Dame quarterbacks in their first complete season behind center. Crist completed just over 59 percent of his throws for 2033 yards, completing 15 touchdown passes and 7 interceptions. Even if we throw out Clausen’s 2007 season, where he ran for his life behind an abysmal offensive line, Crist’s numbers match up well to Jimmy’s 2008 campaign, with Clausen completing nearly 61 percent of his throws for 3172 yards, to go along with 25 touchdown passes and a staggeringly high 17 interceptions. While you’d think Charlie Weis’ vertical offense would show us something different, Clausen’s 7.2 yards per attempt is not that much better than Crist’s 6.9 per throw. Looking further back, even though Brady Quinn played in 11 games as a true freshman, his first sophomore campaign saw him put up numbers remarkable similar to Crist, completing only 54 percent of his throws for 2586 yards with 17 touchdowns and 10 interceptions. Quinn averaged 7.3 yards per attempt, surprising when you think back to the offense that Tyrone Willingham was running at the time.

This isn’t an article about Dayne Crist’s performance compared to Clausen or Quinn, but it does put in context Crist’s performance in his first season playing college football, as well as point out how similar quarterbacking performances help determine overall records, with Clausen and Quinn both ending up a game better than .500, and if Crist would’ve only finished the game against Tulsa, he’d have likely finished at the same place.

If there’s an easy stat that reflects how the 4-5 Irish got to where they are, it’s turnover margin. The Irish rank 82nd in the country in the critical stat, turning the ball over three more times than they’ve taken it away, with 19 turnovers to 16 takeaways.

Even worse, in games the Irish have lost, the ratio is even more pronounced. Notre Dame has turned the ball over 14 times in their five losses, a staggering 2.8 times per loss. Making things even worse, they’ve only managed to force six takeaways in those games, clocking the Irish in at a -1.6 turnover margin during those five losses, the equivalent of the nation’s worst football teams during Irish defeats.

Looking even closer at the Irish turnovers, you’ll see just how catastrophic they were. Against Michigan, the Irish were intercepted three times. With the Irish leading 7-0 and Tommy Rees called into duty with Dayne Crist’s vision blurred, Rees threw a brutal interception to Jonas Mouton. The next play, the Wolverines tied the game 7-7 with a 31-yard touchdown pass. With the Irish driving past midfield thanks to two large runs by Armando Allen, Nate Montana threw a drive-killing interception at the Michigan 37, stopping the Irish in their tracks. While Dayne Crist’s lone interception of the afternoon didn’t end up hurting the Irish, it killed a major momentum swing for the Irish, with Crist making a terrible decision on the first play of a Notre Dame drive and turning the ball over deep in ND territory.

Against the Spartans, it was more of the same. Michael Floyd coughed up the ball just outside the Michigan State redzone, costing the Irish at least three points in the second quarter, with the lead already 7-0 Irish. Crist’s interception on the first play of a drive later that quarter killed the Irish again in Spartan territory and turned into a 94 yard touchdown drive for the Spartans. Crist’s fourth quarter fumbled didn’t lose the game for the Irish, but it killed a potential go-ahead drive close to midfield.

Not to belabor the point, but a Dayne Crist fumble turned into seven points against Stanford. A Crist interception gave the Cardinal 14 points straight from the Irish quarterback’s hands to the wrong team. Against Navy, the Irish could’ve walked into the locker room down only four points, but Crist’s late interception added seven more to the Navy score, and a third quarter pick cemented the Midshipmen’s route. As for the Tulsa game? Well, Rees’ pick six was hardly his fault, but to say that turnovers killed the Irish in that game is an epic understatement.

When looked at cumulatively, the turnovers are maddening for Irish fans, and nearly a blow-by-blow account of what went wrong this season, and why the Irish are looking uphill at a bowl game. But when looking at the last two Notre Dame quarterbacks — two of the best to every play the position for the Irish — Crist’s struggles, especially while experiencing meaningful minutes for the first time and doing so in a new system, begins to make a little bit more sense.

When Brian Kelly talks about the razor thin margin for error this team has offensively, it sounds like coachspeak. But when you look at the games the Irish have lost, that observation looks a lot more insightful. Turning the ball over at critical times, that’s how the Irish got to 4-5.

How we got here: The path to 4-5


With the Irish on bye week, there was no Tuesday Brian Kelly press conference, a likely relief for a coach supplying more questions than answers last weekend as the Irish found a way to lose to Tulsa 28-27, dropping their record to 4-5 on the year.

With no game to prep for this week, I thought we’d take a step back and look at how the Irish got to the place they’re at — a sub .500 record and needing two wins in the final three games to become bowl eligible, something that — for the third season in a row — looked all but a lock at midseason.

I’ll hopefully be bringing in a few different voices to contribute throughout the week, as I think a diverse set of viewpoints is needed during a season like this.

It’s not hard to point to a few obvious reasons why the Irish are 4-5 (turnovers, injuries, etc.), but hopefully we’ll uncover some not so obvious reasons as well.

Consider this a jumping off point to a Macro-week of blogging that’s sure to come.